



THE EU CYBERSECURITY AGENCY

ENISA – 5G SECURITY

Main projects implementing 5G Toolbox



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AGENDA

EU 5G security policy context


Main ENISA publications (Dec 2020 – present)

Report by NIS CG on cybersecurity of Open RAN


5G security certification scheme

5G Matrix


EU 5G SECURITY POLICY CONTEXT



POLICY CONTEXT



MAIN ENISA PUBLICATIONS DEC 2020 – PRESENT



ENISA EECC GUIDELINE

Published in December 2020 and revised in July 2021, this is a general technology-neutral guideline, rather than 5G-specific.

It is an evolution of a prior Article 13a Technical Guideline, first published in December 2011.


29 security objectives grouped into 8 domains

144 high-level general controls and corresponding 171 pieces of evidence, grouped into three sophistication levels.



TM01	Ensuring the application of baseline security requirements (secure network design and architecture)
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SA01	Reviewing or developing guidelines and best practices on network security
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5G SUPPLEMENT TO THE EECC GUIDELINE

Published in December 2020 alongside the EECC Guideline (also revised in July 2021), it adds an additional 5G checklist.

70 5G 'checks'. For example:

- Has a potential dependency on a single supplier of 5G equipment been considered in the risk assessment?
- Do authentication mechanisms implemented follow general good practices and industry standards?
- Is encryption applied for protection of signalling traffic between operators?



TM01

Ensuring the application of baseline security requirements (secure network design and architecture)

SA01

Reviewing or developing guidelines and best practices on network security



5G THREAT LANDSCAPE

Published in November 2019
and revised in December 2020.



SA09

Enhancing cooperation,
coordination and
information sharing
mechanisms

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 POLICY CONTEXT
- 1.2 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
- 1.3 TARGET AUDIENCE
- 1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

2. 5G STAKEHOLDERS

- 2.1 STAKEHOLDERS MAPPING

3. 5G NETWORK DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE

- 3.1 5G USE CASES
- 3.2 GENERIC 5G ARCHITECTURE
- 3.3 CORE NETWORK ARCHITECTURE (ZOOM-IN)
- 3.4 NETWORK SLICING (NS) (ZOOM-IN)
- 3.5 MANAGEMENT AND NETWORK ORCHESTRATOR (MANO) (ZOOM-IN)
- 3.6 RADIO ACCESS NETWORK (RAN) (ZOOM-IN)
- 3.7 NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALISATION (NFV) – MANO (ZOOM-IN)
- 3.8 SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORK (SDN) (ZOOM-IN)
- 3.9 MULTI-ACCESS EDGE COMPUTING (MEC) (ZOOM-IN)
- 3.10 SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (SA) (ZOOM-IN)
- 3.11 5G PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (ZOOM-IN)
- 3.12 IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS / MIGRATION PATHS ZOOM IN
- 3.13 PROCESS MAP

4. 5G VULNERABILITIES

- 4.1 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT METHOD AND SCOPE
- 4.2 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR CORE NETWORK
- 4.3 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR NETWORK SLICING
- 4.4 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR RADIO ACCESS NETWORK
- 4.5 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALIZATION - MANO
- 4.6 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS
- 4.7 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR MULTI-ACCESS EDGE COMPUTING
- 4.8 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
- 4.9 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
- 4.10 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS
- 4.11 VULNERABILITY GROUPS FOR PROCESSES

5. ASSETS

- 5.1 ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND MAPPING
- 5.2 NEW ASSET CATEGORIES
- 5.3 ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND THE CIA TRIAD

5.4 THE RELEVANCE OF ASSETS THROUGHOUT THE LIFECYCLE

6. 5G THREATS

- 6.1 TAXONOMY OF THREATS
- 6.2 THREAT MAP

7. THREAT AGENTS

8. RECOMMENDATIONS/ CONCLUSIONS

- 8.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
- 8.2 CONCLUSIONS

A ANNEX: ASSETS MAP

B ANNEX: THREAT TAXONOMY

C ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN THE CORE NETWORK

D ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN NETWORK SLICING

E ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN THE RADIO ACCESS NETWORK

F ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN NETWORK FUNCTION VIRTUALIZATION – MANO

G ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS

H ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN MULTI-ACCESS EDGE COMPUTING

I ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN THE PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

J ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS

K ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN MNO PROCESSES

L ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN VENDOR PROCESSES

M ANNEX: DETAILED VULNERABILITIES IN SECURITY ASSURANCE PROCESSES

STUDY ON SECURITY CONTROLS IN 5G SPECS

Published in February 2021, this study discusses 3GPP security specifications relevant to 5G.

- Overview of security-related 3GPP TS and TR
- Overview of key 3GPP security features, such as protection of gNB setup and configuration, or protection of RAN interfaces
- Section-by-section description of TS 33.501 in Annex A




TM02	Ensuring and evaluating the implementation of security measures in existing 5G standards	SA04 Developing guidance on implementation of security measures in existing 5G standards
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TECHNICAL DEEP DIVE INTO 5G NFV SECURITY

Published in February 2022.



Technical best practices				Policy best practices			
BP-T1 Security monitoring and filtering	BP-T2 VNF Image validation and protection	BP-T3 Tracking VNF version changes	BP-T4 VNF deployment	BP-P1 Zero Trust	BP-P2 Security Assessment of new or changes to existing VNF Service Templates	BP-P3 Vulnerability handling & patch management	BP-P4 Security testing and assurance
BP-T5 VNF deletion or relocation	BP-T6 Cryptography	BP-T7 Hypervisor protection	BP-T8 Security Management and orchestration				
BP-T9 Remote attestation	BP-T10 Software compliance and integrity preservation	BP-T11 Security segmentation and isolation between network functions	BP-T12 Secure boot integrity	BP-P5 Incident management	BP-P6 Secure Update Management	BP-P7 Restriction on installing applications	BP-P8 Defense in depth
BP-T13 Data protection and privacy	BP-T14 Encrypting VNF Volume/swap Areas	BP-T15 Trusted computing technologies	BP-T16 Hardware security	BP-P9 Strong password policy	BP-P10 Secure supply chain	BP-P11 Resources inventory management system and database	BP-P12 Apply hardening policies
BP-T17 Centralized log auditing	BP-T18 Use and ownership of 'root' administration credentials	BP-T19 VNF protection	BP-T20 Local or removal Blade Storage – SAN protection	BP-P13 Multi-vendors segregation and trust	BP-P14 Security by design	BP-P15 Life cycle management	BP-P16 Software Bill Of Materials (SBOM)
BP-T21 Network security	BP-T22 SDN security management	BP-T23 MANO access control and management	BP-T24 VIM connectivity to hypervisor	Organisational best practices			
BP-T25 Recovery and reinstallation	BP-T26 Deploying VMs of differing trust levels	BP-T27 Orchestration platform security management	BP-T28 Trusted time source	BP-O1 Secure Physical Environment and Geographical location	BP-O2 Training and awareness	BP-O3 Trust model	BP-O4 SLAs establishment
BP-T29 Secure 3rd party hosting environments	BP-T30 Redundancy and backup	BP-T31 Specific container security controls	BP-T32 OSS/BSS protection				
BP-T33 LI capabilities	BP-T34 User plane security	BP-T35 MEC security					

SA01	Reviewing or developing guidelines and best practices on network security
TM04	Increasing the security of virtualised network functions



REPORT ON 5G CYBERSECURITY STANDARDS

Published in March 2022, this report:

- Collects cybersecurity standards *relevant* to 5G.
- Identifies gaps in standardisation and, accordingly, provides recommendations.



TM02	Ensuring and evaluating the implementation of security measures in existing 5G standards	SA04	Developing guidance on implementation of security measures in existing 5G standards
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NIS CG REPORT: CYBERSECURITY OF OPEN RAN




OPEN RAN REPORT

1. Assesses Open RAN **risks** through the framework of the NIS CG Coordinated Risk Assessment (October 2019):
 - Impact on existing CRA risks
 - New 'Open RAN-specific' risks
2. Assess OPEN RAN **opportunities** and the enabling factors.
3. Builds on the EU 5G Toolbox to provide **guidance** for Open RAN deployments.




5G SECURITY CERTIFICATION SCHEME




5G CYBERSECURITY CERTIFICATION SCHEME

Following a request by the European Commission, on 29 November 2021, ENISA launched an ad hoc working group on EU 5G certification scheme.

<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/going-full-throttle-on-cybersecurity-certification-and-market>



5G SECURITY CONTROLS MATRIX



WHAT IS THE (5G) MATRIX?

Consolidating various 5G security controls in a single repository

Numerous sources of information
relevant to 5G security




Benefit to NRAs, telecom
companies and others
stakeholders



**5G Security
Controls
Matrix**

powered by ENISA

ALL CONTENTS SO FAR




5G SECURITY CONTROLS MATRIX - CONTENT

Domain	SO	Sophistication level	Measure ID	TC or check ID	Description	Corresponding evidence	Area(s)	Related assets	Mapping to standards
	SO13: Use of encryption	Basic	M070		Where appropriate to prevent and/or minimise the impact of security incidents on users and on other networks and services, encrypt data during its storage in and/or transmission via networks. The type and scope of data to be encrypted should be determined based on the risk assessment performed and will typically include communication data, customer critical data (e.g. unique identifiers), relevant management and signalling traffic and any other data or metadata, the disclosure or tampering of which may cause security	-Description of main data flows, and the encryption protocols and algorithms used for each flow -Description of justified exclusions and limitations in implementing encryption. Ability to implement encryption may also be influenced by technological limitations, like in the case of legacy networks or when old equipment and network protocols are used			-ISO/IEC 27002:2013: 10.1.1 Policy on the use of cryptographic controls
				TC191	NAS signaling should be confidentiality protected by the MME	Packet captures confirm the encryption of the NAS signaling	IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS	MME	3GPP TS 33.116, cl. 4.2.2.3.4 3GPP TS 33.401, cl. 5.1.3.1
				TC192	User data sent via MME should be confidentiality protected	Packet captures show that the user plane messages over the access stratum at PDCP layer are encrypted	IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS	MME	3GPP TS 33.401, cl. 5.1.3.1
				TC193	User data sent via the MME should be integrity protected	Packet captures confirm the integrity protection of user data with one of the following algorithms: 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, or 128-NIA3	IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS	MME	3GPP TS 33.401, cl. 5.1.4.1
				TC194	All NAS signaling messages except those explicitly listed in TS 24.301 as exceptions should be integrity-protected	Packet captures confirm the integrity protection of the NAS signaling messages with one of the following algorithms: 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, or 128-NIA3	IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS	MME	3GPP TS 33.401, cl. 5.1.4.1/8.1
				TC195	NAS NULL integrity with EIA0 is only used for emergency calls	Packet captures at the MME confirm that the SECURITY MODE COMMAND message sent by the MME after successful UE authentication contains an algorithm different from EIA0 (except for emergency calls)	IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS	MME	3GPP TS 33.116, cl. 4.2.2.3.3 3GPP TS 33.401, cl. 5.1.4.1
<div><div><div>◀▶...</div><div>Checks</div><div>ISOControls</div><div>Standards</div><div>Areas</div><div>Assets</div><div>5GControls</div><div>MatrixA</div><div>MatrixB</div><div>MatrixC</div><div><div>+</div><div>⋮</div><div>◀</div></div></div></div>									

2022 TIMELINE



**5G Security
Controls
Matrix**
powered by ENISA



THANK YOU

ALL FEEDBACK, ADVICE, IDEAS, SUGGESTIONS WELCOME

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